

INVESTIGATING PERSONNEL NEEDS AND PRACTICES OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FEBRUARY 19 (legislative day, JANUARY 29), 1951.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. HAYDEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration,
submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. Res. 53]

The Committee on Rules and Administration, to whom was referred the resolution (S. Res. 53) to investigate personnel needs and practices of the various governmental departments and agencies, having considered the same, report favorably thereon, with amendments, and recommend that it be agreed to by the Senate.

A letter from the chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service explaining the aims and purposes of the resolution (S. Res. 53) to investigate the manpower policy and general civil-service policy of the executive branch of the Government is as follows:

FEBRUARY 3, 1951.

HON. CARL HAYDEN,
*Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR HAYDEN: I am submitting herewith a detailed analysis of the aims of the special subcommittee appointed by me to investigate the manpower policy and general civil-service policy of the executive branch of the Government, together with a budget to provide a staff to assist this subcommittee in its work through January 31, 1952.

At the end of June 1950 when the Reds invaded Korea, the records of the Civil Service Commission showed that we had 1,967,111 Federal workers in the executive branch of the Government. Of that number 753,149 were in the Defense Department—the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The latest report made by Civil Service, for the month of November, shows the total number in the executive branch to have risen to 2,159,997, of whom 966,886 are in the Defense Department. This is a total increase of 192,886. The over-all increase in the Defense Department, however, is 213,737.

Reductions which offset some of the increase in the Defense Department were made in the Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture Departments. But these reductions were in seasonal and temporary personnel—reductions that would have been made in any event. For example, Commerce has reduced its staff which is working on returns from its seventeenth decennial census. Agriculture and

Interior reductions were in their seasonal staffs—people who work during the summer months in the forests and on the public lands. These people will again be put back to work this coming summer.

My point is this—there has been no actual decrease whatsoever, none that wasn't already planned, in employment in the nondefense agencies. Since the last civil-service report, for the month of November, I am reliably informed that the total Federal employment has increased about 55,000, which would make the over-all increase in Federal employment, since Korea, about 250,000 in seven short months.

In addition, we have reliable estimates that Federal employment will increase by perhaps another half million workers by June 30, 1952, 17 months from now. If that happens, the total increase in Federal employment since Korea would reach 750,000.

I believe we all realize that some increase in Federal employment, particularly in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, is and will be necessary to support our troops in Korea and elsewhere overseas. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have hired many thousands of civilian workers to manufacture munitions, to build and repair naval vessels, to store and load supplies, to man air fields, etc.

But I believe, too, that most of us here and the people in general are disappointed by the failure of the President to cut nondefense expenditures to the bone, by the failure of the Civil Service Commission to adopt a realistic and hard-boiled manpower policy for the Government, and by the failure of Federal agencies to transfer more of their experienced employees to the defense agencies where they are urgently needed.

In his state of the Union message, you will recall that the President called on Congress to cut nondefense expenditures, and we applauded him for his statement. He said the Government would have to forego some of the things which some of the agencies believed were necessary.

But the President failed to follow up his statements when he submitted his proposed budget for the 1952 fiscal year. I have examined that budget in detail. In only isolated instances did he propose fewer employees for the nondefense agencies. By and large, he submitted estimates to Congress which proposed either that these agencies retain their present staffs or that they be given increases in personnel. In other words, he has challenged Congress to carry out his expressed desire to cut nondefense spending. I believe we should accept that challenge.

A week ago the President made public his national manpower mobilization policy. I wish to quote two provisions contained in it. They are: (1) "Each individual will be expected to serve in the capacity in which he can contribute most to the total mobilization program" and (2) "That the Government should assist workers to arrange for their transfer to essential jobs."

The central manpower agency for our Government is the Civil Service Commission. I'm frank but sorry to say that it has done very little in developing plans to meet this situation. I sometimes wonder if the Commission and its officials realize the gravity of the situation.

The Congress itself, in an indirect manner, expressed its resentment at the do-nothing and feet-dragging attitude of the Civil Service Commission in regard to the acute manpower problem brought about by the Korean War as far back as last September.

At that time the Congress voted approval of a rider to a supplemental appropriation bill written by Representative Whitten, of Mississippi. The Whitten rider now requires the Government to place most of its personnel actions, such as appointments, grade promotions, interagency transfers, and the like, on a temporary basis. It also sought to have nondefense agencies transfer some of their employees to the defense agencies.

If the Civil Service Commission had been aware of its responsibilities and had acted to meet the emergency situation in Government after the Korean invasion by the Communists, there wouldn't be a Whitten rider. There would have been no necessity for it.

The Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee, which has honored me with its chairmanship, has a definite and clear-cut responsibility to see that the Civil Service Commission is prepared to meet this problem—is prepared to assume its responsibility in directing the manpower policy of this vast Government. We believe that the Senate committee must assist in working out a realistic policy. We must see to it that every single person in the Government's employ is in a job which contributes most to the defenses of our Nation, that no agency has more employees than it needs, that red tape and regulations that make it difficult for experienced employees to transfer to the defense agencies are abolished.

I therefore propose to appoint a special subcommittee to be composed of seven members of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee—four Democrats and three Republicans—to make a detailed inquiry into civil-service policies, to examine the manpower needs of Federal agencies, and to hammer out a manpower policy for the Government for the duration of the emergency.

These are some of the problems I believe the special subcommittee should inquire into:

Whether the personnel of nondefense agencies should be "frozen" at their present levels in order to give defense agencies their choice of the available workers.

To require old-line agencies which either have or will be given defense duties, such as Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, Interstate Commerce, Labor, and others, to handle their new duties by transferring employees from less essential work to them.

To give you an example of what I have in mind, we are now told that the Office of Economic Stabilization is hiring a large new staff to enforce a forthcoming order to freeze prices and wages. May I be permitted to make this suggestion—that Economic Stabilization be permitted to make use of the inspection staff of the Wage and Hour Division to help enforce its orders, as well as the inspection staffs of other Federal agencies. I am certain it could be done and be both more economical and efficient.

To draft a transfer policy, free of red tape and restrictions, that would encourage employees in the nondefense agencies to transfer to defense jobs.

To determine whether the time-consuming civil service competitive tests are necessary during the emergency.

To examine promotion and appointment policies to make certain they are streamlined to meet emergency conditions.

To spotlight Government programs and activities that can be set aside for the duration in order to free employees in nondefense work for pressing defense needs.

To examine the possibility and cost of longer hours for more Government people in order to save manpower, the costs of materials, and office space which additional employees will require.

To go into the question of annual leave to determine whether the rider adopted by the Eighty-first Congress to require employees to take leave earned during the 1950 calendar year by next June 30, or else lose it, is now feasible. Also, adjustments in the leave system may also be considered.

To study the policies relating to the use of civilian and military personnel.

Why is it necessary to assign military persons to civilian positions to get the job done?

The concept of the military and civilian roles in waging a war underwent radical changes during World War II. Technological war as contrasted to hand-to-hand fighting resulted in only one in seven, or even higher, of the military getting into combat areas. The trend which started in World War II requires a new concept of the definition as to which are civilian and which are military positions.

There are fundamental advantages in terms of cost, efficiency, stability and disruption of lives in having as many individuals as possible in the defense effort in civilian positions. If all positions which did not involve actual combat or combat planning and training for combat were filled with civilians, the result would be large-scale economies in both money and manpower.

Conservatively, at least half of the positions in the National Military Establishment now filled by military personnel are in reality civilian positions. The average Government civilian costs approximately \$3,400 a year. The direct and indirect cost of a soldier in uniform is estimated to be at least \$5,000 per year, and some estimates place the cost as high as \$9,000 per year when veteran and other indirect costs are included. Even if one-half of the military positions were changed to civilian positions, it would save annually over 1½ billion dollars, on a conservative estimate, and probably the savings would be several times this amount. In time of national emergency, the savings would be many, many times this figure. Since civilians are a more stable working force, it would result in widespread improvement in efficiency. This would gain added savings through reducing the number of positions required. Other types of savings would result from this work by using the information to operate more efficiently with respect to recruiting, pay, training, organizational planning, and other management processes.

To look into the policy of drafting Federal employees for active military service. I am told there is still no over-all Government policy in this regard after all this time.

To insist that Government supervisors and officials emphasize efficiency and economy in the administration of their offices; to encourage and to give their employees the incentive to do better work; to save manpower; and to cut operating expenses.

To determine whether the Federal Government has adequate machinery to bring into Government people with the necessary know-how to do an effective mobilization job.

We have all been told many times how Government supervisors build up their staffs in order to justify larger salaries for themselves. Our committee considered this problem some months ago. At that time, our able colleague, Senator Long, proposed that employees and supervisors alike be rewarded in cash for economies they initiated in their operations. The Long plan was incorporated in the bill that revised the Classification Act. That was 16 months ago.

I was shocked the other day to read an account of an address made by the Senator from Louisiana. In it, he pointed out that only one single award had been made under that provision. He asked whether those few employees were the only ones in Government who were interested in economy. The Senator brought out that 40 percent of all Federal agencies have shown no interest whatsoever in his economy plan.

This situation brings to mind another major function and responsibility that will be placed in this subcommittee, that of keeping a careful watch on the agencies to see that they carry out the intentions of any congressional action taken. Some people have chosen to call this a watchdog committee. I like that name. It has been very apparent that some agency officials have on their staffs people whose sole function it is to find ways to circumvent the actions and intent of Congress.

These are just a few of the problems that come to mind for the special subcommittee to study. There will be others.

Our Government is the Nation's largest employer. It must take the lead in forging a manpower policy that will get the most out of every employee in these perilous times when the future of our great Nation is at stake.

In the years I have had the privilege of serving on the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee I have had frequent and almost daily contact with Federal employees and their representatives. I am thoroughly convinced that the Government people themselves will unite in throwing their full support behind a program to place them in jobs where they will contribute more to the defense program and their Nation. They were merely awaiting to be led, to be told what and how to do it. Many of them in nondefense work are impatient and anxious to be of greater service to our country in her fight for our way of life.

From the detailed study that I have been able to make of this problem, I am confident that at the end of 1952 we will be able to show the Eighty-second Congress and the people of this Nation that we were able to pave the way in conservation of manpower—to save the taxpayer many millions of dollars—by getting the job done more efficiently without the necessity of hiring hundreds of thousands of additional employees. To this end we dedicate our best efforts and with the undivided cooperation of the Congress I am confident we will be able to show results.

You will find attached the budget referred to in the first paragraph of this letter.

With kind regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,

OLIN D. JOHNSTON,
Chairman, Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

An estimated budget submitted by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and approved by the Committee on Rules and Administration is as follows:

Estimated budget to Jan. 31, 1952, for the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee

Salaries:

2 staff positions, annual gross salary, \$10,846-----	\$21, 692. 00
1 stenographer, annual gross salary, \$4,762.70-----	4, 762. 70
1 stenographer, annual gross salary, \$3,980.59-----	3, 980. 59
2 stenographers, annual gross salary, \$3,632.97-----	7, 265. 94

Total salaries----- 37, 701. 23

Expenditure exclusive of salaries:

Reporting proceedings-----	2, 500. 00
Travel and per diem-----	3, 500. 00

Office expense:

Rent-----	2, 500. 00
Telephone, telegraph, supplies, postage, mimeographing, multi-graphing, printing, and other miscellaneous items-----	3, 800. 00

Total----- 50, 001. 23

The Committee on Rules and Administration has amended the resolution (S. Res. 53) in the following manner:

On page 1, line 3, after the word "the", strike out the words "Eighty-second Congress" and insert in lieu thereof the words "period ending January 31, 1952".

On page 1, line 10, after the word "date" insert a comma and the words "but not later than January 1, 1952,".



An estimate of budget submitted by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and approved by the Committee on Labor and Administration is as follows:

Estimated budget for 1917: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1918: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1919: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1920: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1921: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1922: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1923: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1924: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1925: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1926: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1927: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1928: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1929: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1930: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1931: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1932: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1933: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1934: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1935: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1936: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1937: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1938: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1939: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1940: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1941: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1942: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1943: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1944: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1945: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1946: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1947: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1948: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1949: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1950: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1951: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1952: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1953: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1954: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1955: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1956: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1957: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1958: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1959: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1960: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1961: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1962: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1963: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1964: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1965: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1966: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1967: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1968: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1969: \$1,000,000,000

Estimated budget for 1970: \$1,000,000,000